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NOTES
INSURANCE-INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE AS A BAR TO RE oRmATioN op
LiME INSURANCE PoLicEs.--The United States Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit has recently decided, in Richardson v. Travelers Insurance Company,1 that the incontestable clause in life insurance policies
precludes the insurer, after the "contestable" period has run, from pursuing the traditional equitable remedy of reformation when there has
been a mutual mistake in the integration of the contract.2 This rule is
in direct conflict with the rule previously announced by the Court of
1 171 F. (2d) 699 (C.C.A. 9th 1948).
2

Reformation is appropriate, when an agreement has been made, or a trans-

action has been entered into or determined upon, as intended by all the parties
interested, but in reducing such agreement or'transaction to writing, either through

the mistake common to both parties, or through the mistake of -the plaintiff accompanied by the fraudulent knowledge and procurement of the defendant, the
written instrument fails to express the real agreement or transaction. 3 Pommoy,
EQtz JuzDmPRuDauc § 870 (5th ed. 1941).
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Appeals of the Tenth Circuit, in the leading case of Columbian National Life Insurance Company v. Black.s The rule of the Richardson
case is also at variance with state decisions in which this point of law
4
has been considered.
A consideration of the original purpose, and the subsequent history
and judicial construction of the incontestable clause should assist in an
evaluation and comparison of the incompatible views set forth in the
cases respecting the availability of reformation as a remedy after the
contestable period has run.

I
A typical incontestable clause provides: "This policy shall be incontestable after two years from date of issue, except for non-payment of
premiums." The clause was originally inserted in life insurance policies
by the companies as a sales stimulant.5 The companies had found it
necessary to counteract, in some manner, the public resentment which
had grown up against the insurance companies because of the uncertainty and delay in the payment of death benefits under the policies. Often
when the insured died after having paid premiums for a number of
years, the policy would be contested and defeated by the insurer on
the grounds, for example, that the policy had been procured by fraud
or misrepresentation. The public came to realize that their position as
insured parties, beneficiaries, and as other interested persons was -not
secure, and that prompt and full payment of benefits could not be expected with certitude. Although the contest of policies was often justified because of the actual fraud or misrepresentation of the insured, it
is equally true that policies were frequently avoided after many years
on some mere technicality attributable to the inadvertence of the insured. The susceptibility of life insurance policies to litigation and
possible complete avoidance (after years of premium payment and after
reliance on the validity of the policy) tended to defeat the very purpose of the contract: to secure, in accordance with the desires of the
insured, a legally interested party or parties against the risk of loss
occasioned by the death of the insured. For this reason the incontestable clause gradually became accepted as a standard clause in life insurance policies and is now required by statute in a majority of the
states.

8

35 F. (2d) 571 (C.C.A. 10th 1929).
Mates v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co., 316 Mass. 303, 55 N. E.
(2d) 770 (1944); Neary v. General American Life Insurance Co., 140 Neb. 756,
1 N. E. (2d) 908 (1942); Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v.
Rothstein, 122 N. J. Eq. 606, 195 AtI. 723 (1937); Buck v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 96 Wash. 683, 165 Pac. 878 (1917).
5 Malloy et al. v. New York Life Insurance Co., 103 F. (2d) 439 (C.CA.
4

1st 1939).

NOTES
H
In accordance with the purpose of the incontestable clause, the courts
have held, almost without exception, that the clause will prevent the insurer from raising the defense of fraud or misrepresentation in order to
avoid payment under the policy. 6 However, in early cases the courts
often loosely stated the general proposition that the incontestable clause
should bar all defenses not specifically excepted therein Nevertheless,
as new and varied factual situations arose involving the clause, the
courts in many instances refused to adopt such a general rule when its
adoption would result in inequitable decisions or would operate in unexpected derogation of established legal principles. It would seem that
the confusion surrounding the scope of the clause (specifically, as to
what constitutes a "contest") was caused originally by the unfortunate
general wording of the clause, by the subsequent generalizations of the
courts, and later by the perpetuation in state statutes of the ambiguously worded clause. The combination of these factors has tended to result
in an unnatural broadening of the essentially desirable principle of insurance law that the policy should be construed most favorably for the
insured. Though, as pointed out, the clause was undoubtedly meant
to apply to the defense of fraud or misrepresentation, it is equally true
that the clause was never meant to operate as a warrant to confess
judgment.8 Furthermore, the general and ambiguous wording of the
clause renders frivolous any attempt to apply a misconceived notion of
the "plain meaning" rule of construction, especially since other broad
policy considerations, which will be discussed later, appear to be superior and controlling.
Some courts, recognizing the error of extending the clause to bar
all defenses after the contestable period has run, have found that actions brought by the insured under certain circumstances are not "contests" within the meaning of the clause. Thus the courts have held
6 Ostroff et al. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 104 F. (2d) 986 (C.C.A. 9th
1939); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Margolis et al., 11 Cal. App. (2d)
382, 53 P. (2d) 1017 (1936); Morris v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va.
278, 171 S. E. 740 (1933); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Connallon, 106 N.

J. Eq. 251, 150 Ad. 564 (1930), reversed on other grounds, 108 N. J. Eq. 316,
154 Atl. 729 (1931); Harrison v. Provident Relief As'n. of Wash., D. C., 141 Va.
659, 126 S. E. 696 (1925); Dibble v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, 170 Cal.
199, 149 Pac. 171 (1915).
7 See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U. S. 96, 97, 41 S.
Ct. 47, 65 L. Ed. 155 (1920); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford, 161 Ark.
605, 257 S. W. 66, 67 (1923); Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 50 Ind.
App. 630, 633, 97 N. E 1018 (1912). Slightly more restrictive than the dicta
referred to in the above cases is the statement in Sipp v. PhiladelphiaLife Ins.
Co., 293 Pa. 292, 142 AtL 221, 223 (1928), to the effect that the incontestable

clause is an agreement not to contest the validity of the policy as written.
8 See.Hyatt, The Incontestable Clause in Life Insurance Policies - A Statute of Limitations, but not a Confession of Judgment, 7 U. or NEwARx L. Rzv.
130 (1942).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
that the clause does not preclude the insurer from: avoiding the policy
on the ground that the risk was not covered by the policy, since the
death of the insured had occurred as a result of execution for a crime
(in spite of the fact that the death occurred after the running of the contestable period, and that death under such circumstances was in no way
provided for under the policy); 9 setting up the defense of a third person's fraud in procuring the execution of the policy, as evidenced by the
third person's intent to murder the insured and obtain the benefits of
the policy; 10 showing that the alleged policy never took effect as a contract; 11 proving that the insured was incapable of contracting under
the insurance law; 12 disputing the amount the insured claimed under
the policy; 13 showing abandonment or failure to pay premiums; 14
establishing the fact that someone other than the insured took the
physical examination; 15 showing that there was no insurable interest
in favor of an assignee of the policy; 16 proving that there was no
period allowed the insurer to investigate for fraud. 17 In none of the
above mentioned cases was the defense allowed or the relief granted specifically excepted from the coverage of the clause.
III
As mentioned at the outset, the rule recently announced by the Court
of Appeals in Richardson v. Travelers Insurance Company 18 tends to
broaden the scope of the incontestable clause. Having briefly discussed
the history of the clause and the significance of generally relevant court
decisions as indicating the accepted limits of the clause, the question
9

Scarborough et al. v. American Natl Ins. Co., 171 N. C. 353, 88 S. E. 482

(1916).

10 Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin et al., 175 Tenn. 517, 136 S. W.
(2d) 52 (1940).
11 McDonald v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 108 F. (2d) 32 (C. C.
A. 6th 1939).
12 Ludwinska v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 577, 178 At.
28 (1935).
13 Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 10 F. (2d) 143 (C. C. A.
5th 1925).
14 Haas v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 90 Neb. 808, 134 N. W. 937
(1912).
16 Maslin v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 368 (S. D. N. Y.
1932).
16

(1898).

Clement et al. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Tenn. 22, 46 S. W. 561

17 Reagan v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217 (1905).
It is interesting to note that in at least one case the insurer has sought to avoid
the effect of the incontestable clause by bringing an action at law for deceit
after the contestable period has run, thus, as argued, "affirming" the policy rather than "contesting" it within the meaning of the clause. However, this novel
attempt to avoid the effect of the clause was not successful. Columbian Nat. Life
Ins. Co. v. Wallerstein, 91 F. (2d) 351 (C.CA. 7th 1937).
18 Note 1 supra.
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remains whether a proper basis for the rule of the Richardson case can
be found in a consideration of the previous decisions exactly in point
respecting the availability of reformation,1 9 in controlling equities between the parties in the case itself, or in broad principles of public
policy.
According to the facts of the Richardson case, the insured applied to
the plaintiff company for a policy of life insurance in the amount of
$10,000. Through an alleged mistake the company issued a policy
under which the insured was entitled to receive benefits in twice the
amount afforded by the policy applied for. The premiums paid during
the life of the policy amounted to only slightly more than one-half the
amount the insured would normally be required to pay for the policy
actually issued. The policy contained a standard clause making the
policy incontestable after one year from the date of issue except for
non-payment of premiums. After the policy had been in force for
twenty years,2' the insurance company first became aware of the alleged mistake and brought an action for reformation of the insurance
contract. The lower court decided that the suit for reformation was not
a contest of the policy. Reformation was granted in accordance with
customary equitable principles, the court having found sufficient evidence of mutual mistake in the integration of the insurance contract
to warrant granting the relief prayed for. In reversing the lower court
the court of appeals stated that the wording of the incontestable clause
was clear and unambiguous and that the coverage of the clause should
logically extend to and thus bar an action for reformation of the
policy.

The facts of the Richardson case do not seem in any substantial
respect distinguishable from Columbian Life Insurance Co. v. Black 21
or from other recently decided cases on this subject. 22 The same issue
was raised in all of these cases: whether or not the incontestable clause
should be extended so as to bar action for reformation after the contestable period has run. In one instance, for example, the cash surrender
value was misstated in the policy as issued; reformation was allowed
19 Note 4 supra.

20 Laches of the insurer has largely been ineffective to defeat actions for
equitable relief, even though twenty years or more may have passed since issuance
of the policy. See Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 35 F. (2d) 571 (C.C.A.
10th 1928); Buck v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 96 Wash.
683, 165 Pac. 878 (1917). The unwillingness of the courts to give effect to the
defense of laches in these cases is not in accord with the general rule that, if in an
equitable action, the period has passed under which an action at law would be
barred by the Statute of Limitations, the Statute of Limitations will be applied
by analogy. Kelley et al v. Boettcher et aL, 85 Fed. 55, 56 (C.C.A. 8th 1898).
Thus in the Richardson case, a plea of laches would likely have been of no avail,
despite the fact that twenty years had passed since the issuance of the policy.

21 Note 3 supra.
22

Note 4 supra.
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to correct the policy after the contestable period had run.23 In another case a policy which through a clerical error provided for too
Corlarge a cash settlement was held to be subject to reformation.'
rection and adjustment of the policy for misstatement of age was held
not to be a contest of validity within the meaning of the incontestable
clause. 25 In the Black case, an insured who applied for an ordinary life
policy, but who received an entirely different policy on which he
paid premiums for an ordinary life policy, was not able to invoke the
incontestable clause as a defense when the insurer brought an action
for reformation. 28 A mistake in the cash reserve valuation of an insurance policy was held to be corrected by a letter from the insurer to the
insured, although no other action was taken by the insurer within the
27
contestable period.
As has been indicated above, a majority of the cases specifically in
point have ruled that an action for reformation is not a "contest" within the meaning of the incontestable clause and thus is not barred by
the clause. A further examination of the Richardson case does not disclose any controlling equities between the immediate parties to the
suit which would supp6rt the decision reached by the court. Substantial justice could have been achieved by resorting to the usual requirements for reformation. If the court had seen fit to decide the case on
the customary equitable principles, and had found that the evidence
warranted granting the relief prayed for, it would merely have made
the benefits as provided for in the written instrument conform to
the benefits for which the insured had actually contracted (and paid).
The alleged reason for the rule of the Richardson case fails. The purpose of the incontestable clause - that the insured get what he bargained for without fear of a belated avoidance of the policy-would not
be defeated by granting relief in the form of reformation to the insurer. Public policy does not favor a rule which would contradict the
principle that nothing more should rightfully be given to a contracting
party than the benefits to which he is entitled "in law and in fact." 2 8
It might be argued that, under the rule of the Black case, for example,
a substantial contest of a policy could, in another case, be made under the guise of reformation; but the danger of prejudice to the substantial rights of the insured in such a case is obviated by the stringent
evidential requirements for reformation: the burden of proof which
rests upon the party asking for reformation cannot be satisfied by mere
23

Mates v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., note 4 supra.

24 Neary v. General American Life Ins. Co., note 4 supra.
25 Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v. Rothstein, note 4
supra.
26 Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, note 3 supra.
27 Buck v. Equitable life Assurance Society of United States, note 4 supra.
28 See Buck v. Equitable Life Assur. Society of United States, note 4 supra at
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preponderance of the evidence; evidence of proof of mutual mistake
must be of the dearest and most satisfactory character. 2 9
Of course it would be highly desirable, in deference to the insured,
his beneficiaries, and other interested parties, that any litigation concerning the validity of the policy as written should be required to take
place within a relatively short period of time after the issuance of the
policy. However, it is submitted that reasons of public policy weigh
heavily in favor of preserving the traditional equitable remedy of reformation in these cases, even after the contestable period has run.
Though the insurance policy (the words being those of the insurer) is
to be construed most strongly against the company and most favorably for the insured,8 0 this rule should not be extended to prevent reformation; since the results would in many cases be unreasonable. For
example, if the incontestable clause should be held to preclude reformation in an action brought by the insurer, it would seem that the clause
should likewise bar an action brought by the insured for reformation. 81
Thus if a $10,000 policy were applied for and the policy as written
was for $100.00 because of the inadvertence of a clerk in placing a
decimal point, the insured would not be able to reform the policy after
the contestable period had run; and of course an insurance company
would be prevented from changing a policy which improperly called
for the payment of $10,000 in benefits to the $100.00 policy actually agreed upon. The incongruity of these results is obvious. These
would not seem to be "chamber of horrors" arguments, since they involve practical considerations and situations which may easily arise
in the future.
IV

Conclusions

Despite the unfortunate wording of the incontestable clause, the
early generalizations of the courts, and the subsequent adoption of the
clause by statute as originally worded, the courts, as has been pointed
out, have gradually defined certain circumstances under which the incontestable clause will not bar traditional remedies and defenses. The
decision in the Richardson case is not in accord with this trend, and
does not recognize the limits which the courts have already set upon
the coverage of the clause. 82 Since the incontestable-clause in its present form is not likely to disappear overnight, it would seem prudent
to continue to recognize the limits of the clause which have been set
29

See Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company v. Government of

The Philippine Islands, 247 U. S. 385, 38 S. Ct. 513, 62 L. Ed. 1177 (1918).
30

Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 278, 3 S. Ct. 207, 27 L. Ed.,

932 (1883).
81 See Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, note 3 supra, at 577.
82 It is to be noted that in the Richardson case there were no previous California decisions exactly in point, so that the court was free to adopt a rule
in accordance with the Back case and the other state cases on the subject.
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by judicial construction. Rules and decisions which may result in legal and equitable absurdities will thereby be avoided. Specifically
should the courts avoid adoption of a rule which is in derogation of
the historic remedy of reformation. The court in the Richardson case
emphasized that since the incontestable clause precludes raising the
defenses of fraud and misrepresentation, which are inceptional defenses, the clause should logically be extended to bar an action for reformation based on mistake, which is also an inceptional defense; but it
should be remembered that in the inexact science of judge-made law,
the pursuit of pure logic as a controlling criterion for deciding cases
can lead to legally ludicrous and equitably pernicious results.
Louis F. DiGiovanni
E. A. Steffen, Jr.

DEFAMATION-LIBELOUS PEP, SE-IMPuTATION THAT ONE IS A
CosmMUNIST.-In the past decade such a stigma has become attached

to the name "Communist" in the United States that the courts have
almost unanimously held it libelous per se falsely to impute that one is
a Communist; yet, concurrent with these decisions, the Communists
have functioned as a political party, with the privilege of a place on
the ballot in many states.
The Communist party is not-as yet, at least-prohibited by law;
but the courts, in affirmatively protecting anyone unjustly accused of
being a Communist, have taken judicial notice of the repugnance with
which Communism is generally viewed and have recognized realistically
that the fundamental problem is the significance of the name in the
mind of the typical American citizen.
To say that the name Communist, when falsely applied to a person,
is libelous per se, denotes that the law assumes that anyone called a
Communist suffers serious damage to reputation. It is not the purpose of
this article to become involved in the controversy concerning the use
of the terms "libelous per se," "defamatory per se," or "actionable per
se." Actually the courts use these terms interchangeably, meaning that
the name or words published concerning the plaintiff are of such a
nature that a cause of action is stated without any necessity of showing
special damages, the inference being that as a matter of law anyone so
libeled must have suffered damage.' All that must be proved is the false
publication by the defendant. The important factor is the reaction that
most people have to the name Communist. To call a person a Com1 Sweeney v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 129 F. (2d) 904 (C.C.A. 2nd
1942); Jerald v. Huston, 120 Kan. 3, 242 Pac. 472 (1926); Mattice v. Wilcox,
147 N. Y. 624, 42 N. E. 270 (1895).

NOTES
munist is actionable per se if the populace of a community, section, or
nation consider the name to expose a person to ridicule, disgrace, contempt, hatred, or disdain.
The Communist epithet has not always been so loathsome in the
public mind. Not until 1929 did a case appear warning of any possible
liability for writing of another as a Communist. Then the highest court
of New York merely indicated that it might have been libelous if the
plaintiff had been called a Communist. 2
It is probable that individuals were erroneously identified as Communists prior to this occasion. Nevertheless, throughout that period a
charge of "Communist" was not an ineradicable blemish on reputation,
since Communism was regarded as a mere political and economic theory
in the embryonic stage. Previously courts in diverse jurisdictions had
established the appellations of Anarchist,$ Socialist, 4 or Red 5 as libelous per se. These groups were associated in the public mind with
revolutionary "bomb throwing" forces, denoting violence. They were
regarded as contemptible factions using gangster methods to sabotage
and overthrow the American political and economic system. Similarly,
in the turbulent years before and during World War H, writing falsely
of one as a Nazi, or Fascist, was libelous per se. Considering the
aroused public sentiment toward anything Nazi 6 or Fascist 7, the consequence of being characterized as an adherent of one of these groups
meant immediate loss of reputation and prestige, with exposure to hatred
and possible violence.
In Garriga v. Ritchfield s decided in 1940, the first significant decision appeared relating the false charge of Communism to libel per se.
A New York lower court directly faced the question ".... whether the
statement that one is affiliated with the Communist Party-even though
it be false-constitutes a libel per se?" The court, in a lucid decision
based on the premise that so long as the Communist party is accorded
a legal political status, it is inconsistent to regard a fallacious, written
charge that a person is a Communist as libelous per se, stated: 9
The fact remains, however, that the Communist Party, under existing law, may function as a political party. It may
2

Hayes v. American Defense Society, 252 N. Y. 266, 169 N. E. 380 (1929).

8 Von Gerichten v. Seitz, 94 App. Div. 130, 87 N. Y. S. 968, (1904); Cerveny

v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 III. 345, 28 N. E. 692 (1891).
4 Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 I1. 405, 123 N. E. 587 (1919).
Toomey v. Jones, 124 Ok]. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1926).
6 Derounian v. Stokes, 168 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. 10th
175 Misc. 746, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 148 (1941).
7 Devany v. Quill, 187 Misc. 698, 64 N. Y. S. (2d)
Field, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 785, (1944); Holden v. American
24 (E. D. N. D. 1943); Territory of Hawaii v. Crowley,
8 174 Misc. 315, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1940).
5

9 Id. at 549, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 544.

1948); Levy v. Gelber,
733 (1946); Luotto v.
News Co., 52 F. Supp.
34 Hawaii 774 (1939).
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place upon our ballots its candidates for public office-even for
the highest in the land-and seek popular support for them. It
may, like any other established political party, proclaim its
principles and invite public approval of them. At least while
it possesses that status and those rights, it cannot be held that
it is defamatory per se to say of one that he is affiliated with,
or a member of, the Communist Party, any more than it would
be to say that he is a member of any other legally recognized
political party.
The reasoning in this case has not been followed in subsequent
decisions in New York or other jurisdictions. Yet the very fact of its
isolated position has served to make it conspicuous, and the opinion
merits close scrutiny. If the Communist faction is de facto a true
American political party, the name should not be considered libelous
per se. The court apparently erred in not fully considering society's
antipathy toward Communism and society's refusal to consider the
Communist party as an American political organization. The fact is
that most Americans regard the Communist party as linked with Moscow and as working contrary to the very foundation of the American
government.' 0 To them, Communism is more than a political theory.
It is a way of life diametrically opposed to American concepts of
religion, politics, economics, fair play, and common decency. That
such is the common opinion of Communism is apparent from the
discriminatory attitude of the Federal Government, as expressed both
in Executive Orders 1- and in legislation.' 2
10 For a discussion on this point: see Note, 23 NOTRE DAMM LAWYER 577
(1948). It is interesting to note the words of J. Edgar Hoover in his address
to the American Legion Convention at San Francisco, October 1, 1946, that the
party "is not a true political party," but "is working against our people;" and
remarks of Louis Francis Budenz, former Communist editor, before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities, that "the Communist Party in the United
States is a direct arm of the Soviet foreign department." N. Y. Times, April 4,
1946, § 1, p. 19, col. 6. Also see 45 Micn. L. Rlv. 518 (1947).
11 Presidential order outlining a procedure for the discharge of those employees as to whom reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal to the government: Exec. Order No. 9835, Part V, § 1, 12
Fm. REG. 1938 (1947); for a comment on this order, see 7 LAW Gu -DREv. 68
(1947).
12 The public attitude toward Communists was beginning to be reflected in
Federal Legislation as early as 1940, and continued thereafter. The Nationality
Act of 1940 provides that "No person shall hereafter be naturalized as a citizen
of the United States . . . (b) Who . . . is a member of or affiliated with any
organization . . . that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches-(1) the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States. . . ." 54
STAT. 1137 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 705 (1946). The Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 885 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 723 (1942), 50 U. S. C.
App. § 308 (i) (1946), states that: "It is the expressed policy of the Congress
that whenever a vacancy is caused in the employment rolls of any business or
industry by reason of induction into the service of the United States of an em-

NOTES
In January, 1941, seven months later, another New York lower
court expressed an opinion conflicting with the Garriga decision, in
Levy v. Gelber,1 s a suit involving an attorney charged with being
14
both a Nazi and a Communist. The court stated:
Whatever doubt there may have been in the past as to the
opprobrious effect on the ordinary mind of such a charge...
recent events and legislation make it manifest that to label
an attorney a Communist or a Nazi is to taint him with disrepute.
In November of the same year, a California court in substance
adopted the view expressed in Levy v. Gelber, and rejected the political
party doctrine of Garriga v. Richfield. The court assiduously refrained
from holding that an article referring to the plaintiff as an active member of the Communist party was actionable per se; but concluded
nevertheless that the complaint, with the alleged defamatory statement and innuendoes, was sufficient in law to sustain a cause of action.15
In June, 1942, a year and a half after the decision of Levy v. Gelber, the New York courts were again confronted with the Communistlibel query. Upon review of the two prior divergent New York decisions, the court in Boudin v. Tishman 1I adopted without opinion
the holding of Levy v. Gelber. Despite the summary nature of the
Boudin decision, it is generally regarded as determining the New York
law on the subject.
ployee pursuant to the provisions of this Act, such vacancy shall not be filled
by any person who is a member of the Communist party or the German-American Bund." The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1941 (General and
Special Provisions) has a similar interdiction against the employment of Communists and members of any Nazi Bund organization on any public works
project provided for in that legislation. 54 STAT. 611 (1941). -The Civil Service Law bars any person from employment in the Civil Service who advocates
the overthrow of the Government. 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), 18 U. S. C. § 61i
(1946). The provision of the Taft-Hartley Act relative to filing of non-Communist affidavits is another example: 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 159 ('h)
(Supp. I). "The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittees, is authorized to make from time to time investigation of (i) the
extent, character, and objects of Un-American propaganda activities in the
United State, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and unAmerican propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of domestic
origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our
Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid
Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, 60 STAT. 828 (1946).
13 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 148 (1941), 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 799 (1941),
26 IowA L. Rlv. 893 (1941).
14 Id. at 149, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 148.
15 Gallagher v. Chavalas, 48 Cal. App. (2d) 52, 119 P. (2d) 408 (1941).
18 264 App. Div. 842, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 760 (1942).
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No cases in point appear thereafter until 1945, when in Sack v.
New York Times Co.,' 7 the court indicated their favorable impression
of the reasoning in Levy v. Gelber, by saying:' 8
Whether to charge one with being a communist is libelous
per se is, in these days at least, not free from doubt. Cf. Levy
v. Gelber ... The question need not be decided for plaintiff
clearly has not been so charged.
In Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n.,19 the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Second Circuit, motivated by the authoritative sanction of previous New York decisions, acknowledged the substantive
law of the state as recognizing the application of libel per se to a
false publication in which the plaintiff is alleged to be a Communist.
The court extended the application of the doctrine by maintaining
that any difference between saying that a man is a Communist, and
20
saying that he is a party agent or sympathizer, is one of degree only:
.. . those who would take it ill of a lawyer that he was a
member of the Party, might no doubt take it less so if he
were only what is called a "fellow-traveler"; but, since the
basis for the reproach ordinarily lies in some supposed threat
to our institutions, those who fear that threat are not likely
to believe that it is limited to party members. Indeed, it is
not uncommon for them to feel less concern at avowed propaganda than at what they regard as the insidious spread
of the dreaded doctrines by those who only dally and coquette with them, and have not the courage openly to proclaim themselves.
When the problem was again entertained, a state court of New York
merely gave tacit approval to the astute extension of the doctrine of
Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n. Thus, the court in Mencher v. Chesley 21 avoided taking an affirmative stand, and negatively backed into the question by holding that, as a matter of law, it could not be
said that to write of the plaintiff as the campaign manager for a Communist candidate for public office, was not libelous per se; but held
that it was for the jury by its verdict to reflect the effect of the statement upon the ordinary reader of average intelligence, considering
public attitude today towards Communism and towards those in
political and ideological fellowship with it. This decision has an os17 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 794 (1945), af'd, 270 App. Div. 401, 59 N. Y. S. (2d)
888, (1946).
18 Id. at 794, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 794.
19 151 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 2nd 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 797, 66
S. Ct. 492, 90 L. Ed. 485 (1946).
20 Id. at 735, 151 F. (2d) 733.
21 270 App. Div. 1040, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) 108 (1946), 45 MICH. L. Rxv. 518
(1947).
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tensibly frustrating effect, as it is difficult to determine whether the
majority felt that a direct charge of Communism was not libelous
per se, or that the complaint failed to allege such a charge.
In another Federal court decision, Wright v. Farm Journal, Inc.,22
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, emphatically reaffirmed the now crystallized law of New York. The court declined to
undertake any "jurisprudential gymnastics" to avoid the patent doubt
emanating from the Mencher v. Chesley decision. In following their
previous reasoning, the court found libelous per se a publication charging that the president of the New York State Farm Union was a member of the Communist party. In the opinion it was emphasized that the
jury should have been instructed that the publication was libelous
per se and that their only function was to determine its validity and
assess the damages.
In Spanet v. Pegler,2 8 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit unequivocally concurred with the Second Circuit,
holding:24
A reading of these cases forces us to the conclusion that in
Illinois it is libelous per se to write of a man or a corporation
that they are Communists or Communist sympathizers, because the label of "Communist" today in -the minds of many
average and respectable persons places the accused beyond
the pale of respectability and makes him a symbol of public
hatred, in violation of the statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, c. 38
§ 402.
The case was not so easily disposed off, however. A subtle and
delicate political libel problem was before the court. Westbrook. Pegler,
through a syndicated column, had blasted Communism. The plaintiff
25
was referred to in this column, which was entitled:
As Pegler Sees It.
Communists Go 'Big Busihesa'
to Trick U.S.
By Westbrook Pegler.
A thorough and analytical study of the portion of the article set forth
in the complaint leads to the conclusion that Pegler's purpose probably was two-fold: (1) to convey to the public that Spanel was a
Communist or a Communist sympathizer, and (2) by astute and diligent draftsmanship to refrain from direct accusations, thus avoiding
liability for libel. The court realistically swept aside the flimsy veil,
22
23

158 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 2nd 1947), 26 NM. L. REv. 105 (1947).

160 F. (2d) 619 (C. C. A. 7th 1947), 13 Mo. L. REv. 113 (1948), 32
Mm. L. Rxv. 80 (1947), 14 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 697 (1947).
24 Id. at 622, 160 F. (2d) 619.
25 Id. at 620, 160 F. (2d) 619.
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declaring that although Pegler did not actually state that Spanel was
a Communist or Communist sympathizer, the ordinary reader could
understand the article to mean that Spanel was, in fact, one or the
other. The court emphatically stated, however, that it did not hold
that this was the only interpretation, but that where two possible
meanings- one libelous and the other not-could be imputed to the
article, it was the province of the jury to decide which meaning reasonable persons would infer.2
In the most recent consideration of the problem, a nisi prius court
in Ohio 27 faced the question squarely: "Is it libelous per se to write
of one that he is a Communist?" With an adroit opinion including
a comprehensive review of existing decisions the court answered the
28
question affirmatively, saying:
Whether language has -that tendency [libelous per se] depends upon several factors; upon the temper of the times,
the current of contemporary public opinion, with the result
that words, harmless in one era, in one community, may be
highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a different

locality.
If skepticism dominated the Communist libel issue in 1940, no
discernable inconsistencies exist in the law today. An inexorable pattern of decisions leads to the conclusion that this problem is solved.
The de jure political party argument has been refuted through the
courts' recognition of the general public disfavor in which Communism
29
is held today.
26 For a similar holding on same facts, see Spanel v. Pegler, 70 F. Supp. 926(Conn. 1946).
2" Burrell v. Moran, 82 N. E. (2d) 334 (Ohio Com. P1. 1948).
28 Id. at 335.
29 Many recent events and expressions of prominent groups and persons reflect public opinion. The Catholic War Veterans, New York County Chapter,
urged the outlawing of the Communist Party. N. Y. Times, January 25, 1948,
§ 1, p. 22, col. 4. Outlawry was urged by the American Legion of New York
State at a recent convention. N. Y. Times, January 28, 1948, § 1, p. 6, col. 5.
Cardinal Speliman appealed to the United States to save the world from Communism. N. Y. Times, February 7, 1948, § 1, p. 5, col. 6. The Pope addressed
the Roman Cardinals urging all Catholics to carry on a world fight against Communism. N. Y. Times, June 3, 1948, § 1, p. 1, col. 4. Recent Army regulations
barred the wearing of service uniforms at Communist events. N. Y. Times, November 14, 1948, § 1, p. 14, col. 2. It was stated in the U. S. House of Representatives that the Communist party's purposes are espionage and treason. N. Y. Times,
January 28, 1949, § 1, p. 1, col. 2. Representative Walter proposed a bill to strip
United States citizenship from any citizen joining the Communist party. N. Y.
Times, March 11, 1949, § 1, p. 22, col. 6. Communist control bills were proposed
by Senator Ferguson and by Senator Mundt and Representative Nixon, with provisions including the registration of Communist front organizations, labeling of
their propaganda, establishing a peace-time espionage control ban, banning the
appointment of Communists to Federal office and the issuance of passports to
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The resultant solution leads, ironically enough, to a new policy
question. The nation is now confronted with a novel but serious problem - the rigorous enforcement of libel per se as to charges of Communism on one hand, versus the exigency of exposure of subversive
activities on the other. The peremptory neld of ferreting Communists
and party sympathizers from beneath the protective bulwarks of
pseudonyms, underground cells, spy schools and other conspiratorial
devices,8 0 to an exposed position before public scrutiny, is a proposition which few non-Communists will deny. It is before the public
scrutiny and only there, that the Communists' avowed purpose of
violent revolution to set up a Soviet dictatorship can be thwarted.31
Yet, harassed by litigation, one attempting to expose Communists
may encounter almost insurrmountable obstacles in proving the truth
of publication, although the accused be in reality a Communist. These
obstacles form a shield of immunity for Communists and fellowtravelers who, under the guise of Americanism, prey upon society, sowing seeds of discontent.
In conflict with the public fervor to expose Communists is the
necessity of protecting non-Communist, left-wing liberals. Without the
deterrence of libel per se, these Americans - advocates of economic
and social changes within the form of the Constitution - would be
afforded scant protection against -the unscrupulous who would ruin
reputations for political gain.
The solution to this paradox will not be facilely determined, as
the law here is closely allied with world politics and ideologies. Of
momentous import will be the results of the current trial invqlving
the top Communist leaders in the United States.3 2
John L. Globensky

Lenton G. Sculthorp

them; also making the sections prescribing the penalties, and conspiracy provisions
more specific than in the 1948 bill. N. Y. Times, March 9, 1949. J 1, p. 1, col. 8;

commented on March 13, 1949, § 4, p. 7, col. 1. A bill was passed by the
Illinois Senate making membership in the Communist party a felony and members subject to imprisonment. N. Y. Times, March 23, 1949, § 1, p. 7, col. 5.
80 Testimony by surprise witness at Communist trials indicated that the
Communist party had received orders to obtain maps of forty defense plants in
the United States. N. Y. Times, April 27, 1949, § 1, p. 1, col. 2.
81 See testimony of witness for Government at Communist trials as to postwar Communist teaching and advocacy of violent destruction of American Democracy on instructions from Premier Joseph Stalin. N. Y. Times, April 13,
1949, § 1, p. 22, col. 1.
82 Party Chairman W. Z. Foster and 11 other leaders were indicted on a
charge of conspiring to overthrow the United States Government. N. Y. Times,
July 21, 1948, § 1, p. 1, coL 8.
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Tim FEDERAL ESTATE TAx-PRESENT STATUS OF THE "POSSESSION
OR ENJOYMENT" PHRASE.-Few, if any, provisions of the Internal Rev-

enue Code have vexed courts and commentators more than that portion
of Section 811(c) which requires including in the decedent's gross estate
the value of all property transferred inter vivos which was "intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death." This
phrase first appeared in a Pennsylvania statute enacted in 1826, taxing
collateral inheritances,' and with minor variations has been a part of
the federal estate tax law since the Revenue Act of 1916.2 In limine
it is well to state that the phrase itself is perplexingly ambiguous and
readily admits of several equally plausible interpretations. Unfettered
by prior judicial and juridical expositions which have closed this particular avenue of interpretation, it might well be argued that the presence of the word "intended" in the statute clearly implies a subjective
test to determine whether in transferring property during his life time,
the decedent actually intended the transferee to obtain possession or enjoyment of the property only at or after his death. The companion
phrase "in contemplation of . . . death" undeniably demands a subjective test to determine the decedent's motive at the time of the transfer. s As indicated, however, little attempt has been made to apply
other than an objective test in the decisions which have interpreted this
4
portion of the statute.
In the federal courts, at least, the form of this objective test has
centered upon the meaning of the word "transfer" and the battle has
been waged over the types of transfers that necessarily fall within the
provision. The Supreme Court of the United States at first placed emphasis upon whether or not "something passed" from the decedent at

his death, 5 its reasoning being influenced largely by legalistic common

law property concepts. Burdened by these rules of property law,
a unanimous court in May v. Heiner 6 ruled that the retention by
I Pa. Acts 1825-6, c. 72, approved April 7, 1826. See Note, 56 YALE L. 3. 176
(1946).
2 Revenue Act of 1916 § 202(b), 39 STAT. 756, 777-78 (1916), reads in part as
follows: "... . That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property ... (b)
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer, or with respect to which he has created a trust, in contemplation of or
intended 'to -take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death. . . ." INT.
REv. COD8 § 811(c) now reads in part as follows: "... To the extent of any interest therein of which -the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or
otherwise, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death.. ..
"
8 United States v. Wells, et al., 283 U. S.102, 51 S.Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867
(1931).
4 See note 25 infra.
5 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S.339, 49 S.Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed.
410 (1929).
0 281 U. S.238, 50 S.Ct. 286, 74 L. Ed. 826 (1930).
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a decedent of a contingent life estate in trust property was not a "transfer" includable in the gross estate under the applicable provisions of
the Revenue Act of 1918.7 This decision represented the.minority view
of the lower federal courts at the time, and rejected the construction
placed upon the statute by long-standing Treasury Department Regulations.8 Likewise, it was opposed by numerous state decisions interpreting similar provisions of inheritance tax statutes. 9 Nevertheless
the court reaffirmed its stand in three per curiam decisions less than a
year later.' 0 The day following these decisions, on the eve of adjournment, Congress amended this portion of the statute by adding a provision to the existing language which expressly includes transfers wherein the decedent has reserved a life estate. 11 The legislative history of
this amendment clearly indicates it was not to receive retroactive application, 12 and the Supreme Court held accordingly in a later case which
presented this exact question only.18 The state courts refused to adopt
this restrictive interpretation engendered by an adherence to legal subtleties, but continued to apply the more realistic economic tests when
interpreting similar provisions of their respective death tax statutes,
thereby rendering the phrase more meaningful as a check upon tax
avoidance.' 4
7 Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(c), 40 STAT. 1097 (1916).
8 U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 24 (1919); U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 24 (1921);
U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art 18 (1926); U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 18 (1929).
9 See cases collected and discussed in 49 A. L. R. 864, 878-892 (1927), and
67 A. L. R. 1247, 1250-1254 (1930). The Pennsylvania court as early as 1884, in
construing the progenitor of all similar clauses (note 1 supra), placed stress upon
the word "enjoyment" when the settlor had retained the income for life, saying
in part: "... . One certainly cannot be considered as in the actual enjoyment of an
estate, who has no right to the profits or income arising therefrom . . . The policy
of the law will not permit the owner of an estate to defeat the plain provisions
of the collateral inheritance law, by any device which secures to him, for life, -the
income, profits and enjoyment thereof; it must be by such a conveyance as parts
with the possession, the title, and the enjoyment in the grantor's life time." Reish,
Adm'r. v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 521, 526 (1884). However, at least two commentators have indicated that a distinction should be &awn when state inheritance
tax statutes are being interpreted, since they place a tax upon the right to receive
property while the federal estate tax is levied upon the right to transfer property.
See Surrey and Aronson, Inter Vivos Transfers and the FederalEstate Tax, 32 Coz.
L. R v. 1332 (1932).
10 Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782, 51 S. Ct. 342, 75 L. Ed. 1412
(1931); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 783, 51 S. Ct. 343, 75 L. Ed. 1412 (1931);
McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784, 51 S. Ct. 343, 75 L. Ed. 1413 (1931).
11 46 STAT. 1516-1517 (1931), now embodied in the Code. INT. REv. Coon §
811(c).
12 See comments of Mr. Garner, member of Committee on Ways and Means,
74 CoNo. Rxc. 7198-7199 (March 3, 1931).
13 Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303, 58 S. Ct. 559, 82 L. Ed. 858 (1938).
14 Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co., 114 Conn. 207, 158 Atl. 245 (1932), aff'd,
287 U. S. 509, 53 S. Ct. 244, 77 L. Ed. 463 (1933) ; Hacket v. Banker's Trust Co.,
122 Conn. 107, 187 AtI. 653 (1936); In re Kutsche's Estate, 268 Mich. 659, 256
N. W. 586 (1934) ; Rising's Estate v. State, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N. W. 459 (1932).
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In Klein v. United States 5 it was held that the grant of a life
estate to A with reservation of the fee in the grantor, coupled with a
grant of the fee to A should he survive the grantor was a taxable "transfer" within the meaning of the pre-1931 language of the statute because, under the applicable Illinois law, the legal title remained vested
in the grantor after the deed was executed. Four years later, the Court
again delved into the subtle diversities of conveyancing in the St. Louis
Union Trust Co. cases,' and there determined that a transfer in trust
for the benefit of A and her children or descendants, but providing for
reversion to the settlor in the event of the death of A during the life of
the settlor, was not taxable as part of the settlor-decedent's gross estate.
The Court-in those cases was careful to distinguish the factual situation
from that presented in the Klein case, and clearly indicated that taxability under the "possession or enjoyment" phrase would henceforward
rest upon the "elusive technicalities of the art of conveyancing." In
other words, if the trust were construed to create a vested remainder,
the settlor could successfully avoid the imposition of an estate tax, even
though express provision were made for a reverter in the event the beneficiaries pre-deceased the settlor or the property returned to the settlor
by the operation of a resulting trust.
Recognizing that this doctrine ignored the substance and rewarded
the form of inter vivos transfers, the Court in Helvering v. Hallock 17
disregarded property concepts and held the incidence of the estate tax
to depend upon whether the decedent had retained a valuable interest
the final disposition of which was postponed until after his death. The
trust in this case expressly provided for a reversion of the property to
the settlor-decedent should he outlive the beneficiaries. In effect the
decision held that any transfer expressly conditioned on survivorship
was a "transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death." Through the over-ruling of the St. Louis Union Trust
Co. cases and the abolition of the tenuous distinctions there engrafted
upon the earlier Klein case, the "possession or enjoyment" phrase became an effective instrument to frustrate estate tax avoidance, and for
the first time in its twenty-four year existence, approached the obvious
purpose of its enactment. 1 8 The Hallock case was followed by two
15 283 U. S. 231, 51 S. Ct. 398, 75 L. Ed. 996 (1931).
16 Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74, 80 L.
Ed. 29 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78,
So L. Ed. 35 (1935).
17 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940).
18 The subsequently issued U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17 (1942), as amended
by T. D. 5512, 1 Cumm. BuLL. 264 (1946), provides that a transfer falls within
the scope of this phrase if both of the following conditions exist: ".. . (1) possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be obtained only by beneficiaries
who must survive the decedent, and (2) the decedent or his estate possesses any
right or interest in the property (whether arising by the express terms of the in.
strument of transfer or otherwise) ."
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cases 19 in which the principal question was the proper valuation to be
placed upon the interest retained by the grantor in pre-1931 transfers.
Since there were no outstanding life estates, the Court in both cases
held the entire value of the transferred property includable in the decedent's gross estate.
In two recent cases, 20 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the tax status of pre-1931 transfers where the only interest retained by the settlor-decedent was a remote possibility of reverter by
operation of law. (The Church trust also reserved the income to the
settlor for life.) Since the Hallock trust had expressly provided for a
reversion to the settlor should he outlive the named beneficiaries, the
lower federal courts, the Tax Court and the Treasury Department were
in disagreement on this problem. 2 ' 'After argument and consideration
of the two cases during the. October 1947 Term, doubt arose as to the
continuing validity of May v. Heiner,22 and thereafter the cases were
restored to the docket with the request that the counsel address their
23
discussion on reargument to specific questions set forth by the Court.

19 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U. S. 108, 65 S. Ct. 508,
89 L. Ed. 782 (1945), involved a reservation of a contingent power of appointment coupled with a life estate. Commissioner v. Estate of Field, 324 U. S. 113,
65 S. Ct. 511, 89 L. Ed. 786 (1945), expressly provided for a reversion should the
beneficiaries pre-decease the settlor in addition to reservation of the income for
life.
20 Commissioner v. Church's Estate, ....U. S....., 69 S. Ct. 322 (1949) ; Spiegel's
Estate v. Commissioner, ....U. S...., 69 S. Ct. 301 (1949).
21 The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals had
held that the mere existence of a possibility of reverter in the decedent, whether
expressly retained or whether resulting from operation of law, irrespective of remoteness, caused the property to be included in his gross estate. See Dominick's
Estate v. Commissioner, 152 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 2nd 1946); Commissioner v.
Bayne's Estate, 155 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 2nd 1946); Beach v. Busey, 156 F. (2d)
496 (C. C. A. 6th 1946); Commissioner v. Spiegel's Estate, 159 F. (2d) 257 (C. C.
A. 7th 1946), aff'd, ....U. S_..., 69 S. Ct. 301 (1949); Commissioner v. Bank of
California Nat. Assoc., 155 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S.
725, 67 S. Ct. 73, 91 L. Ed. 628 (1946), motion for rehearing denied, 329 U. S.
827, 67 S. Ct. 184, 91 L. Ed. 702 (1946). The concurring view of the Treasury
Department is parenthetically expressed in U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17 (1942),
as amended by T. D. 5512, 1 Cumm. Buix. 264 (1946); see note 18 supra. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Tax Court had held to the contrary where
remote possibilities of reverter by operation of law were involved: Commissioner
v. Church's Estate, 161 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 3rd 1947), rev'd, ....U. S....., 69
S. Ct. 322 (1949); Estate of Nettie Friedman, 8 T. C. 68 (1947).
22 Following the Hallock case at least one perspicacious commentator advanced the view that its rationale had removed any existing support for May v.
Heiner. See Note, 49 YAIE L. J. 1118 (1940). However, its validity was still
supported by others. See MoNTOmaxRY, FEDERL TAXES oN ESTATES, TRusTs AND
GnIrs (1943-44) at 380, "In view of the changes in the Supreme Court, there
can, of course be no certainty that the theory of Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Co. and May v. Heiner will be followed. In the opinion of the author, however,
the Ha~lock case, of itself, is not in conflict with those decisions."
23 The nine questions are set out in footnote 6 of Mr. justice Burton's dissenting opinion in the Spiegel case, 69 S. Ct. at 3089.
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The Church trust, established in 1924, provided for payment of the income to the settlor for life and for the distribution of the corpus of the
trust at his death to his surviving children, if any - otherwise to his
surviving brothers or sisters or their children. No further disposition
being made, dispute arose as to the operation of the applicable New
York law in the unlikely event that all the beneficiaries should predecease the settlor. A majority of the Court, however, declined to rest
their decision on this phase of the case, but ruled the reservation of life
income to be the decisive factor, thereby upsetting May v. Heiner and
casting aside whatever lingering vestige of property concepts remained
in this portion of the estate tax law. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for
the majority, reiterates the conviction of the present Court that taxability under the "possession or enjoyment" phrase depends upon the
substance and not the form of the inter vivos transfer: 24
How is it possible to call this trust transfer "complete"
except by invoking a fiction? Church was the sole owner of
the stocks before the transfer. Probably their greatest property value to Church was his continuing right to get their income ...Looking to the substance and not merely to form,
as we must unless we depart from the teaching of Hallock,
the inescapable fact is that Church retained for himself until
death a most valuable property right in these stocks-the right
to get and to spend their income ...He simply retained this
valuable property, the right to income, for himself until death,
when, for the first time the stock with all its property attributes "passed" from Church to the trust beneficiaries. Even if
the interest of Church was merely "obliterated" in May v.
Heiner language, it is beyond all doubt that simultaneously
with his death, Church no longer owned the right to the income; the beneficiaries did. It had then "passed." It never
had before. For the first time, the gift had become "complete."
The Spiegel trust, created in 1920, provided that the income therefrom
be paid to the settlor's three children during his life, or if they should
pre-decease him, to their surviving children, the corpus to be distributed
at his death in the same manner. The effect of such a disposition under
the Illinois law was not free from doubt; however, the Court refused
to disturb the finding of the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit
that the property would revert to the settlor in the event he should
survive the named beneficiaries. Acknowledging the remoteness of
this possibility, 25 the majority, again speaking through Mr. Justice
Black, stated in part as follows: 28
Commissioner v. Church's Estate, ....
U.S.....,
69 S. Ct. 322, 328-329 (1949).
Spiegel was survived by -the three children living at the date the trust was
created in addition to three grandchildren. The dissent of Mr. Justice Burton in
24
25
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...In the Church case we stated that a trust transaction cannot be held to alienate all of a settlor's "possession or enjoyment" under § 811 (c) unless it effects a "bona fide transfer in
which the settlor absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and
without possible reservations, parts with all of his title and all
of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred
property. After such a transfer has been made, the settlor
must be left with no present legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that title, and no right to possess
or to enjoy the property then or thereafter. In other words
such a transfer must be immediate and out and out, and must
be unaffected by whether the grantor lives or dies." We add to
that statement, if it can be conceived of as an addition, that it
is immaterial whether such a present or future interest, absolute or contingent, remains in the grantor because he deliberately reserves it or because, without considering the consequences, he conveys away less than all of his property ownership and attributes, present or prospective. In either event the
settlor has not parted with all of his presently existing or future contingent interests in the property transferred. He has
therefore not made that "complete" kind of trust transfer that
§ 811(c) commands as a prerequisite to a showing that he has
certainly and irrevocably parted with his "possession or enjoyment."
The dissent of Mr. Justice Burton in both the Church and Spiegel cases
is based primarily upon the failure of the majority to consider the factual intent of the settlor, 27 and secondarily upon the belief that the
law of New York and Illinois did not give rise to a possibility of reverter in either case. Insofar as this latter ground of dissent is based
upon tenuous distinctions between vested and contingent interests, it
is reminiscent of the decisions prior to the Hallock case. Mr. Justice
Jackson's concurrence with the dissent in the Church case and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's combined dissent in both cases rest mainly upon the
doctrine of stare decisis and the legislative history surrounding the
this case points out that the mathematical value of this possibility of reverter at
the time the $1,000,000.00 trust was created in 1920 was less than $4,000.00. Its
value at Spiegel's death in 1940 was about $70.00.
26 Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, ....U. S....., 69 S. Ct. 301, 303 (1949).
27 Thus in Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, ....U. S.,
69 S. Ct. 301, 314
(1949), he states: "'Intended' should be given its normal factual meaning. To intend means to 'have in mind as a design or purpose....' The question of intent
is one of fact, difficult to determine, but determinable, nevertheless. Section 811(c)
involves more than merely determining whether a transfer took effect, as a matter of law, at or after death or whether a 'string or tie,' as a matter of law was
retained until death. There remains for determination the fact whether the settlor
did actually intend -that the 1920 transfer take effect in possession or enjoyment
upon the expiration of the trust at his death."
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Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931. Both stress the difficulties encountered when tax policy is controlled by interstitial court rulings, and
both prefer to construe the failure of Congress to set aside the May v.
Heiner doctrine as an implied sanction of the construction there applied
to pre-1931 transfers with life income retained.
As yet the Treasury Department has given no indication that it will
issue regulations to mitigate the hardship these decisions will work upon
taxpayers who executed trusts in reliance upon May v. Heiner.28 Reasonable belief that such regulations will be forthcoming is founded upon
prior action of the Treasury Department in similar situations. 29 Regardless of such relief, all existing trust instruments should now be reviewed with meticulous care in light of the Spiegel case to insure that
the settlor has not inadvertently retained some possibility of reverter
which he does not wish to have.
William V. Phelan

EQUITY-INUNCTION-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESSPUBLICATION OF LIBEL.-A rule which has persisted in American Juris-

prudence since the last century states: Equity will not enjoin the publication of a libel.' The origin of this precept is generally attributed

to a dictum of Lord Eldon in the 1818 case of Gee v. Pritchard.2 However, it may be noted that Lord Eldon's view was not necessarily the
traditional or prevailing law in England, there being decisions both before and after 1818 holding to the contrary. 8 The strongest foundation
28 Ample authority for such non-retroactive application of decisions upsetting
prior doctrine is found in § 3791(b) INT.Rzv. CoDn.
29 U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17 (1942), as amended by T. D. 5512, 1 CUm.
BULL. 264 (1946), following the Hallock case, provided that where the transfer
was made during the period between Nov. 11, 1935 and Jan. 29, 1940, and the
Commissioner (whose determination is to be final) determines that such transfer
is classifiable with the transfers involved in the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases
rather than with the transfer involved in the Ilein case, and the property was
finally treated for all gift tax purposes, then the property so transferred shall not
be includable in the decedent's gross estate. This provision remains operative following the Church and Spiegel cases. Taxpayer reliance upon May v. Heiner is
confined to approximately eight and one-half months.
1. See 32 C. J., Injunctions, § 432; 28 Am. Jim., Injunctions, § 118; 4 Pomxoy, EQury JURISPRUDENc
§ 1358 (5th ed. 1941); McCuNrocz. oN EQU
§§ 156, 157 (2nd ed. 1948).
2 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
3 Even in Gee v. Pritchard, the court succeeded in avoiding its own rule,
by granting the injunction and stating that such action was necessary for the
protection of a property right. Commented Walworth, C., in Brandreth v. Lance,
8 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839): "But it may, perhaps, be doubted whether his lordship
in that case did not, to some extent, endanger the freedom of the press by assuming jurisdiction of the case as a matter of property merely, when in fact the ob-
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for the rule is probably Blackstone's statement concerning freedom of
the press: 4
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of
a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon ublicatons... Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid
this is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publish
what is improper, mischevious [sic], or illegal he must take the
consequences of his own temerity. (Emphasis supplied).
Lord Eldon's principle is often more honored in the breach than in
the observance. 5 It is indeed strange that such a rule, founded only on
a dictum and continuously avoided -where convenient, should survive
these many years. Indeed, never once has it been refuted directly in
this country.0 This situation is made all the more odd by the fact that
the doctrine no longer holds in England, the country of its birth. Under
the judicature acts in effect there, the chancery courts now perceive
no difficulty in granting injunctions against a libel. 7
In 1916, Roscoe Pound expressed his feeling of confidence that
"some strong court presently will take the direct course" in enunciating
the rule that equity has jurisdiction in cases of libel.$ In 1949 we are
still awaiting that "strong court." However, in viewing the many cases
in which the existing standard has been circumvented, one may argue
that the question is mainly academic, and a direct overruling of the
principle is unnecessary. To refute this argument it is necessary only to
review the vast majority of cases in which the precept has prevailed,
oftentimes to the apparent contravention of justice. 9
ject of the complainant's bill was not to prevent the publication of her letters on
account of any supposed interest she had in them as literary property, but to restrain the publication of a private correspondence, as a matter of feeling only."
In 1810, Lord Ellenborough, in speaking of a picture, remarked arguendo that
if it was a libel upon the persons introduced into it, "upon an application to the
Lord Chancellor he would have granted an injunction against its exhibition."
DuBost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. 511, 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (1810).
While there" are English cases decided after 1818 that uphold the right to enjoin publications, Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De G. F. & J. 217, 45 Eng. Rep.
861 (1861); Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551 (1868); Dixon v.
Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 488 (1869), they were overruled as to libel in Prudential
Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. 142 (1874), which was decided without reference to the Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 25.
4 4 Br. ComM.* 151.
5 See Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S. W. 233, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
6 Perhaps the closest any court in this country has come to an outright denial
of the rule is this 1880 dictum: "We recognize the rule that a court of equity upon
a proper case has the power to enjoin the publication and circulation of a libel."
Bell & Co. v. The Singer Manufacturing Co., 65 Ga. 452, 459 (1880).
7 See Bonnard v. Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch. 269.
8 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
HAv. L. REv. 640, 668 (1916).
9 See cases cited note 1 su~ra.
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It is difficult to visualize a set of facts which would not give a court
opportunity to avoid the strict rule, if it so desired. Pound himself
stated: "So long as denial of relief in such cases rests on no stronger
basis than authority our courts are sure to find a way out." 1o True,
the way has been found, but it is not often used.
There are various situations in which the courts in this country have
afforded relief, and thereby conformed to justice, without directly controverting the precept in point. Often the courts have said that libel
may not be enjoined, but if the libel forms an element of some other
tort, that other tort may be enjoined, even though this in effect enjoins
the libel. A typical case illustrating this point is Old Investors' &
Traders' Corporation v. Jenkins." The defendant had published false
statements concerning the plaintiff and its business. The court said: 12
While in the action at bar the court could not enjoin the
mere publication of a libel, it could, provided the facts of the
case warranted, issue an injunction against the defendants
from mailing or otherwise sending to customers of the plaintiff
false and misleading circulars or reading matter which would
take away plaintiff's business by unfair means and deceive the
public, and give such other and further relief as would to the
trial court seem necessary to protect plaintiff's property
rights.
The case in favor of granting an injunction may be strengthened in
such situations if the court recognizes the threatened injury as irreparable.1 3 The courts are no doubt often influenced by the presence of bad
faith on the part of the one committing the libel. 14 In this same category (where libel is in effect enjoined by the injunction of some other
tort) may be placed those cases in which the courts have issued injunc10

Loc. cit. supra note 8.

133 Misc. 213, 232 N. Y. S. 245 (1928), aff'd, 233 N. Y. S. 845 (1928).
232 N. Y. S. at 247. To the same effect are: Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.
v. Wahlgren, 1 F. Supp. 799 (N. D. Ill. 1932), aff'd, 68 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 7th
1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 639, 54 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 1491 (1934); Gibraltar
Savings & Building Association v. Isbell, 101 S. W. (2d) 1029 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
I3 Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N. E. (2d) 436 (1937) (after the
plaintiff refused the defendant's request to install new steering apparatus in. an
automobile which the defendant had bought from the plaintiff, the defendant tied
lemons on the automobile and drove it about the city covered with writing stating
that the automobile had been bought from the plaintiff and was no good, and
made public statements to the same effect, knowing them to be false, and making
them solely to injure the plaintiff and to extort money from him); Yood v. Daly,
37 Ohio App. 574, 174 N. E. 779 (1930) (two retail kosher meat dealers brought
an action against a rabbi, to enjoin the latter from printing and distributing circulars and making speeches libeling and slandering the dealers in their businesses,
by publishing that the meat sold by them was not kosher meat).14 Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N. E. (2d) 436 (1937); See Starns
v. Success Portrait Co., 28 F. Supp. 711 (E. D. Tenn. 1939).
11
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tions forbidding the publishing of circulars or statements the purpose of
which is to induce customers to break their existing contractual relations with business firm .15
Many decisions have been rendered wherein the courts did not peg
their jurisdiction on the presence of any other tort besides the libel involved, but considered it sufficient to warrant the intervention of equity
that the injury was irreparable, or that the remedy at law was inadequate. In Emack v. Kane 16 it was said: 17
I cannot believe that a man is remediless against persistent and continued attacks upon his business, such as have been
perpetrated by these defendants against the complainant, as
shown by the proofs in this case. It shocks my sense of justice to say that a court of equity cannot restrain systematic
and methodical outrages like this, by one man upon another's
property rights. If a court of equity cannot restrain an attack like this upon a man's business, then the party is certainly remediless, because an action at law in most cases would
do no good, and ruin would be accomplished before an adjudication would be reached.
It is not necessary that the remedy at law be totally inadequate.
Jurisdiction in equity is not tested alone by the fact of a
remedy existing at law, but, as stated in the early case of
City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91, 9 L.
Ed. 1012 (1835), the jurisdiction may be sustained "upon the
principle. that equity can give more adequate and complete relief than can be obtained at law," cited in Re Debs [sic],
158 U. S. 587, 15 S. Ct. 907, 39 L. Ed. 1092 [1895].18 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is not difficult to appreciate the inadequacy of an action at law for
damages when the defendant is insolvent.1 9
15 Anerican Malting Co. v. Keitel, 217 Fed. 672 (S. D. N. Y. 1914); National Life Insurance Co. of the United States v. Myers, 140 In. App. 392 (1908);
Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., 194 N. Y. S. 44 (1921).
16 34 Fed. 46 (C. C. N. D. Il. 1888).
17 Id. at 50. To the same effect are: Dittgen v. Racine Paper Goods Co.,
164 Fed. 85 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1908), aff'd, 171 Fed. 631 (C. C. A. 7th 1909);
Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. (2d) 383 (1943); Grand Rapids
School Furniture Co. v. Haney School Furniture Co., 92 Mich. 558, 52 N. W.
1009 (1892); Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.
W. 13 (1898); Pratt Food Co. v. Bird, 148 Mich. 631, 112 N. IV. 701 (1907);
Burke Transit Co. v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N. C. 768, 47 S. E. (2d) 297
(1948); Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S. W. (2d) 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
18 Dittgen v. Racine Paper Goods Co., 164 Fed. 84, 85 (C. C. E. D. Wis.
1905). To the same effect is Maytag Co. v. Meadows Manufacturing Co., 35 F.
(2d) 403 (C. C. A. 7th 1929), cert. denied 281 U. S. 737, 5 S. Ct. 250, 74 L. Ed.
1151 (1930).
19 Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark-Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471, 35 N. E. 280
(1893).
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As in the category of cases where the libel was enjoined indirectly,
there is evidence in this group of cases of the effect of bad faith on the
courts. "The court is not prepared to say that a case may not be so
saturated with fraud, falsehood and malice as to require the summary
interference of a court of equity." 20 In fact, there are some situations
in which the indicia of bad faith seem to be the persuasive factor in the
court's determinations to grant injunctions.21
The decisions to grant equitable relief are sometimes induced by the
fact that damages are often difficult either of proof 22 or of accurate
measurement.2 3 And there is some basis for the holding that equity will
enjoin the further publication of a libel after an action at law in
which there was a verdict adverse to the defendant,2 4 not to mention
the numerous instances where the courts have granted injunctions
25
pendente lite.
20 Adriance, Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 98 Fed. 118, 119 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1899).
21 A. B. Farquhar Co. v. National Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714 (C. C. A. 3rd
1900), reversing 99 Fed. 160 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1900); Adriance, Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C.C.A. 2nd 1903); Hudson Motor Specialties Co.
v. Apco Manufacturing Co., 288 Fed. 871 (R. I. 1923), a'ffd, 299 Fed. 19 (C.C.A.
1st 1924); Hotel & Railroad News Co. v. Leventhal, 243 Mass. 317, 137 N. E. 534
(1922); Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Publishing Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139
N. E. 655 (1923); H. E. Allen Manufacturing Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187,
229 N.Y. S. 692 (1928).
22 M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagen, 207 Mass. 394, 93 N. E. 584 (1911) (the
defendant drove through the streets a wagon bearing placards announcing the existence of a strike, long after the strike had in fact ended. This was not shown
to have caused any damage to the employer); Wilner v. Bless, 243 N. Y. 544, 154
N. E. 598 (1926) (the signs carried and the circulars distributed by the members
of the defendant's local union did not honestly or fairly state the nature of the
labor dispute between the plaintiff and the local. The purpose of the dissemination of the false or misleading information was to injure the plaintiff's business
and so to coerce him to employ members of the defendant's lcal only).
23 Davis v. New England Ry. Publishing Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N. E. 565
(1909) (in order to obtain a monopoly in a certain department of the express business, persons controlling a majority of the general local express companies doing
business in a city induced a publisher of a purportedly complete list of reputable
express companies in the city to omit one such company, by making false representations to the publisher about the company, and by threatening injury to the
publisher unless the company's name was omitted); M. Steinert & Sons Co. v.
Tagen, 207 Mass. 394, 93 N. E. 584 (1911), cited supra note 22.
24 See Wolf v. Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (1916).
25 Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 Fed. 135 (C. C. S. D.
Ohio 1891); Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. 71 (C. C. N.

D. Cal. 1905); Evenson v. Spaulding, 150 Fed. 517 (C. C. A. 9th 1907), affirming
149 Fed. 913 (C. C. E. D. Wash. 1906); Electric Renovator Manufacturing Co. v.
Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 Fed. 754 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1911), aff'd, on rehearing,
189 Fed. 1023 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1911); Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Underwear
Co., 210 Fed. 347 (E. D. Wis., 1913); American Mgrcury v. Chase, 13 F. (2d)
224 (Mass. 1926); Adjusta Co. v. Alma Manufacturing Co., 36 F. (2d) 105 (S.D.
N. Y. 1930); Saxon Motor Sales v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 885
(1938).
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From a review of the foregoing it may appear that the general principle-equity will not enjoin the publication of a libel-has been completely overruled. However, it should be remembered that the illustrations offered are a summation of all the methods used to avoid the
principle in every state of the union. Many states will recognize one
of the exceptions to the rule, and ignore the others. Some states have
as yet to recognize any of the exceptions. Although the courts are continually becoming more astute in discovering various means to avoid
the doctrine when they feel that justice demands such action, the majority of these cases are still decided by a blind observance of the long
prevailing standard.
The two main arguments against overruling this precept directly are
stare decisis and the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech, or of
the press.26
We have seen the weakness of stare decisis in this particular case. 27 The rule arose in a dictum, was in effect overruled in the
very case in which it arose, and has been circumvented in numerous
cases from its conception to the present time. The remainder of this
article will deal with the freedom of speech aspect.
In contrast with Blackstone's view that "liberty of the press . . .
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications," 28 (emphasis supplied) two eminent American authorities may be cited who hold
otherwise. Justice Story stated: "The constitutional guaranty was intended to guarantee liberty of publishing the truth." 29 Cooley felt
that the constitutional guaranty does not give one the right to publish
whatever he pleases, including libels, but only what is not harmful in its
character.80
There is perhaps one other means whereby the courts in some states may circumvent the rule being discussed in this article. A 1924 Texas case arose from
the following facts: A person with whom a woman had had illicit relations made
statements against her, watched over her, imposed himself upon her on public
streets, made false charges about her to public officials, and prevented her marriage to another. Upon the woman's demand for an injunction, the court said:
"In our opinion it is not necessary that our determination of this question should
be based solely on principles of equity, for the reason that ample authority is
given our courts by article 4643, Revised Statutes, to protect by injunctive relief
both property and personal rights. Subdivision 1 of this article authorizes the
issuance of writs of injunction. 'where it shall appear that the party applying for
such writ is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief or any part thereof
requires the restraint of some act prejudicial to the applicant.'
"... In view of the provision of article 4643 . . . , it is our opinion that the
courts of this state are not required to search for rights of property on which to
base jurisdiction to grant injunctions protecting personal rights, but are free to
grant such relief whether property is, or is not, involved." Hawks v. Yancey, 265
S. W. 233, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
26 U. S. CONST. AmEND. I.
27 See note 3 supra.
28 4 BL. CoMr. *151.
29
3o

2 STORY, CONSTITiON §§ 1880, 1886.
2 Cooirx, CoNsTTunoifAL LIIrrATioNs 883-86 (8th ed. 1927).
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Does not Blackstone's view seem too strict when compared with
these other two? Should the law hold that anyone has the absolute and
inalienable right to speak, print, and disseminate libels and lies, which
wreak destruction or irreparable injury to one's business or injure his
reputation, provided the defendant is willing to pay for the privilege? 3'
Should one be allowed to complain that he is being deprived of a constitutional right when he is prevented from libeling another and deliberately destroying that person's good name? 32
The injustice of such a strict rule lies in the fact that the law is utterly incapable of awarding adequate damages. Where the libel is one that
charges improper and immoral conduct, the damages cannot be computed in dollars and cents. 83 As has been stated: 84
Unlike converted personal property, something similar or
equivalent to it cannot be purchased with money, nor can it be
restored like other matters of substance by the person who has
wrongfully taken it. Reputation is necessary for a man to live
as befits his nature; injury to it results often in irreparable
damage to the individual's personal, economic, and social life.
For that reason society owes an urgent duty to preserve it for
the individual. Adequate protection can only be given by
preventing the cause of damage; money damages are altogether inadequate, just as they are in the case of unique
chattels. Today, will some court say that a good name and
honor in the community, merit equitable protection?
What of the proud boast of equity that it will not suffer an injustice
to be done where there is a remedy? And where a-remedy is given,
would it not be more honest to offer it directly, rather -than under the
guise of some other long recognized principle?
Most assuredly the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution
guarantees freedom of speech, but it also guarantees various other freedoms. Should not the different provisions be harmonized, so that
"freedom of speech" cannot be used as a hiding place of wrong, injustice, and crime? 3r
George Ratterman
31 See Note, 11 VA. L. REv. 225 (1925).
32 See Note, 17 MARQUET

L. RaV. 132 (1933).

Blackstone's "strict view" is not the absolute law in the United States. "Freedom of expression is not limitless. For example, freedom of press does not protect
the publication of immoral or indecent matter from legislative control. People v.
Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175 (1902); nor does it prevent prohibitions upon
publications dangerous to a warring nation. Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243
17 L. Ed. 589 (U. S. 1862); nor does it give immunity from contempt of court.
Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 1 L. Ed. 155 (U. S. 1788)." Note, 21 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 518 (1947).
83 Note, 11 VA. L. Rav. 225 (1925).
34

Note, 17 MARQum'nE L. Rsv. 132, 137, 138 (1933).

See Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899);
Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), cited supra note 25; note,
16 TEx. L. REv. 111 (1937).
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